3d DCA Watch -- Apodictic All Over Again!

Hi kids! The sun is shining, I have been windsurfing all morning, and the forecast looks good for a return to the waves later this afternoon.

Hey, it's summer, right?

So let's jump right in and see what the mostly wise white men think, you know, the resplendently robed swillers of coffee-on-high, who dispense mighty mighty justice in carefully controlled, episodic bursts from a purpose-built, retractable, heavily fortified concrete bunker, yes it's a completely apodictic edition of 3d DCA Watch:

Jetbroadband v. Mastec:

Isn't it great when you get a chance to cite Venetian Salami?

It almost makes conducting the dreary, hopelessly-addled FL long-arm jurisdictional analysis worthwhile.

I said "almost."

Here the 3d "makes law" by concluding that two corporations can confer exclusive jurisdiction on our own little circuit court simply by agreeing to it. Who'd a thunk?

Well, Ed Mullins actually, who is cited in the opinion. Congrats Ed!

Meanwhile, have fun standing in line waiting for all those foreclosure cases to get adjudicated -- your case will be set for trial in 2017, assuming the courthouse is not completely out of funds by then.

Witt v. La Gorce Country Club:

Does the economic loss rule apply to professional negligence claims?

Who the hail knows -- what another completely messed-up area of FL jurisprudence.

You know, I remember a time back in the early 90s when the economic loss rule was nearly as popular as "paninis" are today.

Back then, you couldn't shake a stick at a piece of commercial litigation without having to deal with some young associate saying "but what about the economic loss rule? Do you think the economic loss rule applies?? Huh, do ya?? Do ya think??"

And then you'd pretend to have to know something about it and more or less was required by law and your senior partner to raise it in pretty much every brief you filed.

Good thing nobody likes it anymore.

In fact, here the 3d makes some more "law" by extending the analysis of the FL Supremes in Moransais to professional negligence claims even where there is a professional services contract with an express limitation of liability:

By allowing a professional negligence claim against an individual on common law and statutory grounds, and finding that the doctrine designed to prevent “parties to a contract from circumventing the allocation of losses set forth in the contract” does not preclude such a claim, the Florida Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged that claims of professional negligence operate outside of the contract. Because a professional negligence claim exists and operates outside of a professional services contract, it would be inapposite to limit such a remedy to the confines of the very document outside of which it was intended to operate.

A cause of action in negligence against an individual professional exists irrespective, and essentially, independent of a professional services agreement, as evidenced by section 492.111(4) and Moransais, and, therefore, we find that the limitation of liability provision was, as a matter of law, invalid and unenforceable as to Witt.

Are you convinced?

Laurore v. Miami Automotive Retail:

Ever have a liar for a client? Wait, don't answer that.

How about one that Judge Gordon described as a "con artist, he is a liar. . . . It’s not right and he is using this Court to do it and I won’t let him.”

Umm, check please!

But Judge Wells is all full of that dreaded empathy and so just affirms the dismissal sanction as to a portion of the plaintiff's damages claims.

But not Judge Shepherd.

Oh no, there's a lot of...well, badness in the world today. I see it in court every day. I've sentenced boys younger than you to the gas chamber. I didn't want to do it- I felt I owed it to them.

Oops, had a Caddyshack moment there.

Anyways, Judge Shepherd thinks this guy should get the business, and I mean the whole business:

It is apodictic, however, that on appeal from an order dismissing an action on the basis of fraud on the court, we cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Instead, as the Florida Supreme Court has instructed us, “to justify reversal, it would have to be shown on appeal that the trial court clearly erred in its interpretation of the facts and the use of its judgment and not merely that the court, or another fact-finder, might have made a different factual determination.” Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983); Baker v. Myers Tractor Servs., Inc., 765 So. 2d 149, 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Tramel v. Bass, 672 So. 2d 78, 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). I cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this case for fraud.

Well, let me revise and extend my remarks -- he just relies on the standard of review.

But is it a clear error standard, or an abuse of discretion standard?

Who knows -- it's all apodictic anyways.