I'm pretty sure every lawyer loves to threaten another lawyer with section 57.105 sanctions, especially by email or letter.
Nothing is more momentarily satisfying yet ultimately devoid of any real significance whatsoever.
But when you go ahead and serve the motion, then your lasting feelings of superiority and Domineering Overlord Type-A Top Dogness kick in, at least for a day or two until you get a nasty response and a countermotion for fees and sanctions.
Which brings us to today's 3d DCA Watch and a fundamental rule of 57.105, the 21 day safe harbor period.
Who could possibly be unaware of this rule?
On appeal, the City argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion for attorney’s fees and costs because the claimant failed to follow the twenty-one day “safe harbor” provision of subsection 57.105(4). See generally Nathan v. Bates, 998 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Burgos v. Burgos, 948 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); O’Daniel v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 916 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). The City points to the undisputed fact that the claimant failed to serve his motion for fees on the City twenty-one days prior to filing the motion with the clerk and presenting it to the trial court. The City also argues that the claimant failed to adhere to the requirements of subsection 57.105(4) by filing its motion on September 11, 2009, one month after the trial court entered the order granting the claimant’s motion for summary judgment. See O’Daniel, 916 So. 2d at 41 (holding that motion for attorney’s fees was untimely under subsection 57.105(4) where motion was served and filed following the conclusion of the trial).Come on, the 21 day period wasn't observed, seriously?
Based on the authority of Davidson v. Ramirez, 970 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), we agree with the City that the trial court erred in granting the claimant’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.
Yes, Virginia, this is why we have appellate courts.