Monday, December 31, 2012

Happy New Year, Plebes!

Well it's that time of year, and most of you are away in North Carolina, the Keys, Colorado and points east, west, south, and north somewhat.

We hope you had a decent 2012 and wish all of you a prosperous, successful, peaceful, and loving 2013.

Thanks for all the tips and comments!

Ok, I'll leave you with one more image of an unshaven beach bum on vacation after a year of hard work -- yes, you guessed it:

Friday, December 28, 2012

SFL Friday -- Sometimes an "Ale House" Is Just an Ale House.

I don't know about you, but this Lanham Act case involving two generic-sounding "ale houses" in Boca is my idea of Sartre's No Exit.

In fact, I'd rather spend an eternity locked in a dark room with [insert opposing counsel you hate the most] than have a few beers at either of these establishments:

We find nothing particularly unique in a restaurant fixing its name in red letters on the outside of its building and on its menu, branding items it sells with that name, dressing its staff in khakis and a polo shirt, featuring a center bar with a soffit, offering seating at “high-top” tables, and paneling its walls with wood. These are the prototypical features—what we might call the “common . . . design,” Brooks Shoe, 716 F.2d at 858—of a standard sports bar or brew pub. The particular name affixed on the wall and to menu items, the specific color of the polo shirts, the type of wood on the walls, the placement of the “high-top” tables, and the openness of the kitchen,14 “even if they in combination could be deemed unique,” Wiley v. American Greetings Corp., 762 F.2d 139, 142 (1st Cir. 1985), are all “mere refinement[s]” of this “commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamentation.”
What, no bibs and buttons?

"My buns have no seeds."

Thursday, December 27, 2012

Newly Filed Documents in Lewis Tein Dispute!

A blockbuster filing in the Lewis Tein state court case accuses Miccosukee Tribal lawyers of committing fraud on the Court.

The filing attaches two documents that appear to support Lewis Tein's account of the financial arrangement between them and their clients -- that the monies provided by the Tribe were merely advances or loans that the clients were obligated to repay.

The first document appears to be an internal Tribe account statement reflecting monies advanced or loaned by the Tribe to the clients.

The second consists of minutes of Tribal general council meetings in which the clients request advances or loans so they can pay Lewis Tein's legal fees.

The motion asks the Court to issue a show cause order holding the Tribe's attorneys in contempt, as well as a referral to the Florida Bar for numerous violations of the Bar rules and for "direct and knowing fraud on the Court."

Happy holidays!

Wednesday, December 26, 2012

3d DCA -- Christmas Hangover Edition.

I don't know about you, but that was some good Chinese yesterday!

For those few of you still laboring during the break between Christmas and New Year's Eve, have no fear:  the bunker is here, bringing good cheer, wishing you a happy New Year, Happy Gilmore is in my ear:

13 Parcels v. Laquer:

Filing a motion to transfer one case to another in the civil division does not waive arbitration, especially when you note same in your motion:
As we have previously held, “[t]here is . . . a strong public policy favoring arbitration. ‘All questions concerning the scope or waiver of the right to arbitrate under contracts should be resolved in favor of arbitration rather than against it.’” Zager Plumbing, Inc. v. JPI Nat’l Constr., Inc., 785 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (internal citations omitted). The appellants filed their demand for arbitration before filing their motion to transfer. Moreover, the motion to transfer, while specifically referencing the Iberia Lawsuits, did so, on its face, to advise the trial court of the pending demand for arbitration and for the logical purpose of ensuring that in the event the pending litigation cases were transferred to the same division, any potential arbitration award be adopted by trial judge ultimately presiding over the other cases. This is simply insufficient to constitute a waiver of the right to arbitrate.
Vorbeck v. Betancourt:

"Pure" bills of discovery still exist, barely.

Universal Music v. Montaner:

Judge Schwartz reverses Judge Langer on personal jurisdiction:
Although it is admitted that the defendant-appellant, Universal Music Venezuela, S.A., has no agents or employees and does no business itself in Florida, the plaintiff claims, and the trial judge apparently agreed, that personal jurisdiction may be asserted against it here because of the activities of an affiliated, but entirely separate corporation, Universal Music Latino, which, under a contract with the appellant, does distribute its products in this state. Because, however, there is no evidence that the appellant in any way controlled or directed the operations of Universal Music Latino, this claim may not be sustained.
Chase v. Sosa:

Judge Shepherd reverse Judge Caballero who had vacated a foreclosure sale and gently chastises her:
We have no doubt the trial court’s motivation in reaching its decision was inspired by benevolence and compassion for the family. We also are mindful that in equity jurisdiction there is some play in the joints. John Crescent, Inc., 382 So. 2d at 386. However, as we recently have said, “[a] trial court is not free to refuse to follow the law because of some personal disinclination or otherwise.”
Excessive empathy?

Monday, December 24, 2012

Happy Noche Buena!

In Casa SFL the kosher pig has been marinating for three days, and the guys setting up the caja china this morning seem pretty pickled as well.

What a tangled tapestry we weave in South Florida!

I plan to spend the day playing dominoes with my neighbors (mahjong but with less bubbes), tending to the coals, sipping Gosling's black seal rum, and in general thanking the universe for blessing us all for another day.

Merry Christmas!

Sunday, December 23, 2012

I Miss The Big Man

It never gets old, eh Rumpole?

Friday, December 21, 2012

And You Thought Bounce Houses Were Bad!

Try taking your kid on a nice cruise.

What kind of monster are you?

It truly is the end of the world as we know it.....

Thursday, December 20, 2012

11th Circuit Reverses Judge Ryskamp in 18th Century Historical Dispute!

It's rare, given the standard, for an appellate court to reverse the factual findings of a district judge made during a bench trial.

It's even rarer when the subject matter is an arcane dispute that dates back to Napoleon times.

First, get a load of the parties:
Plaintiff-Appellant Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta (Plaintiff Order) is a religious order of the Roman Catholic Church that undertakes charitable work internationally. Defendant-Appellee The Florida Priory of the Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, The Ecumenical Order (The Florida Priory) is also a charitable organization, having an expressly ecumenical, rather than Catholic, association.
Then there's the factual history, recounted like it came from a Dan Brown novel:
According to these witnesses, Plaintiff Order was founded in Jerusalem in the eleventh century. (D.E. 144, 37:11–12.) It relocated to the City of Acre and later to the island of Rhodes, where it was known as the Knights of Rhodes. (Id. at 37:12–16.) After spending about two hundred years on the island of Rhodes, the group located in Malta (becoming the Order of Malta), which had been ceded for the Order’s use by Emperor Charles V. (Id. at 37:16–18.).....Around 1797 or 1798, the Order of Malta was suffering financial hardship and sought monetary support from Czar Paul I of Russia. (Id. at 108:20–109:3.) Two knights went to Russia seeking to obtain the property of the former Polish priory, and out of this visit came an agreement to create a Catholic-affiliated Russian priory. (Id. at 110:25–111:9.)

In 1798, Napoleon expelled the Order of Malta and its knights from the island of Malta, and the organization relocated to present-day Italy. (D.E. 144, 37:17–19; D.E. 145, 111:13–25.)2 The Order of Malta’s Grand Master at the time, Ferdinand von Hompesch zu Bolheim, wrote to Czar Paul I for support after this expulsion. (D.E. 145, 111:12–18.) Czar Paul I, in response to the request for assistance and “for reasons best known to himself,” created a non-Catholic order for the non-Catholic members of his court. (Id. at 112:6–10.) What happened next forms the crux of both parties’ historical arguments.
Ok, I've had enough.

Listen, nobody loves history more than I do, but if tune into the History Channel it's because I'm interested in ancient sex or Bigfoot.

(Actually, it's just a matter of time before those two concepts converge).

Wednesday, December 19, 2012

3d DCA Watch -- Once More for OJ McDuffie, With Feeling!

Hi kids, the bunker produced a plethora of opinions this morning, but only one of them held my attention.

That's the continuing saga of former Dolphin wide receiver O.J. McDuffie and his malpractice action against famed sports doc John Uribe.

(Isn't it annoying when fellow lawyers tout how they had Uribe do their minor meniscus tear, as if by selecting this doc it somehow confers some sort of elite status onto their weekend warrior tennis injury?)

Anyhoo, Judge Genden threw out OJ's trial victory, and the 3d affirmed:
After this Court’s consideration of all of the issues presented on appeal, we conclude the complained of errors cumulatively rose to the level where they permeated the entire trial and were fundamental so as to deprive the appellee, Dr. Uribe, of a fair trial. We therefore do not find that the trial judge abused his discretion by ordering a new trial.
OJ's effort to have Genden removed was denied as well.

Congrats to Wendy Lumish!

Tuesday, December 18, 2012

Judge Cooke: Court-Imposed Deadlines Almost as Important as Your Fantasy League!

Or a bris, or a marriage, or possibly even the season finale of "Homeland":
Due to the procedural importance of the response(s) at issue, denying Defendants’ Motion for Enlargement of Time to Answer or Response to Plaintiff’s Second Amended seems Draconian in this complex matter. However, a reasonable person, let alone an officer of the court, must understand why it troubles me to grant any further extension to the Defendants. It should go without saying, but in this instance requires stating that a court-imposed deadline is an event of significance in a litigator’s life. It cannot and should not be disregarded in favor of vacation or minor hurdles. Justice Joseph Story cautioned all attorneys, “I will not say with Lord Hale, that the Law will admit of no rival ... but I will say that it is a jealous mistress, and requires a long and constant courtship. It is not to be won by trifling favors, but by lavish homage.”2
She's right -- if you know you need more time, why wait until the last day to seek an enlargement?

Then there's the dog-ate-my-homework feel of the explanation provided by counsel:
Counsel for Defendant Cypress states that upon return to his office following a twelve-day vacation, he learned that his Westlaw service was not operational. This explanation for failure to comply with a court order remains unclear. Defendant Cypress is represented by two distinct attorneys working from two separate offices in two separate locations. Was Westlaw down for both attorneys? Was neither attorney able to use the legal research resources of co-Defendants’ counsel with whom they made an agreement to spearhead the drafting of the response to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint?
Oh boy.

Monday, December 17, 2012

Kluger v. Randazza, the Appeal!

This just in -- formerly anonymous blogger appeals poorly-conceived order enjoining her from posting "defamatory blogs in the future" that concern a local developer.

You can read the opening brief here.

In other news, Jack Reiter wrote a pretty darn good motion to dismiss the RICO suit against Lewis Tein pending before Judge Cooke.

Here's a taste:
Although the Second Amended Complaint is longer, it suffers from the same defect that warranted this Court’s October 10 Order. Despite listing hundreds of invoices purporting to identify legal services rendered to the Tribe, juxtaposed with a litany of Lewis and Tein’s alleged household purchases, the Second Amended Complaint does not identify a single incident of purported fraud. The allegations do not provide any basis upon which Lewis or Tein can defend themselves. Furthermore, because the Court has already given the Tribe the opportunity to allege their RICO claim with the requisite particularity, there is no basis for giving the Tribe yet another opportunity. Simply stated, if the Tribe had the ability to advance a claim for fraud or RICO, it would have done so. The Court should dismiss this case with prejudice as to Lewis Tein.
Listen, it's very hard to properly plead a RICO claim even when you have fantastic facts and evidence.

Methinks Judge Cooke will give this a close read.

Friday, December 14, 2012

Bob Marley Lawsuit Settled!

A dispute among family members over intellectual property rights to the great Bob Marley catalogue has finally settled.

A notice of stipulation of settlement was filed before Judge Cooke, and the terms are confidential.

The settlement follows a mediation with Rodney Max.

You can read the complaint here.

The best part is that Bob Marley approves!
“This was a sensitive case which involved historic facts and many moving parts. The legacy of a great man and a great family were at stake. Fortunately, we were able to come up with a settlement which was amenable to the family members involved,” said Santucci. “From what I learned about Bob Marley and his intentions, he would be happy with our recent achievements, especially the peace brought to the family,” said Santucci.
And so does Rihanna!


Thursday, December 13, 2012

Turns Out You Need a Subpoena to Depose Somebody.

Sometimes it takes a federal judge to point out the obvious.

Take, for example, the situation where you want to depose a bunch of employees of the opposing party.

How do you do that?

Can you just notice them for deposition?

Turns out the answer is no:
Although these six employees may well be able to provide relevant information (or information likely to lead to admissible evidence), the Court nonetheless cannot compel Plaintiff to produce them for deposition. Only a party to the litigation may be compelled to give deposition testimony pursuant to a notice of deposition. If the party is a corporation, it’s deposition may be noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), in which case the corporation must designate an individual to testify as the corporate representative. Alternatively, the party seeking a corporate deposition may identify a specific officer, director, or managing agent to be deposed and notice that individual under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(1). But, a corporate employee who does not qualify as an officer, director, or managing agent is not subject to deposition by notice.
How about that?

You learn something new every day!

Wednesday, December 12, 2012

3d DCA Watch -- Mayor Giving Testimony = Irreparable Injury!

Hi kids, it's 12.12.12 blah blah blah.

Does anyone else find that boring?

In other news, give 'till it hurts.

Finally, the bunker dwellers -- per curiam -- grant a writ of certiorari and quash a deposition subpoena that the Dade County PBA served on Mayor Gimenez.

Seems to me the majority is applying the Mr. Fantastic jurisdictional test -- it's as elastic as it needs to be.

Would a Mayor testifying unnecessarily in a deposition really be irreparable harm?

Not according to Judge Corinas in dissent:
I would deny the petition for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the petitioners have not met their burden of showing irreparable injury.
Finally, RIP dear Mr. Shankar.

Tuesday, December 11, 2012

Hispanic FL Republicans Sued Reince Priebus!

I just like saying "Reince Priebus."

But did you know a Florida Hispanic GOP group sued National GOP Chair Reince "twice and repeat" Priebus for reducing Florida's GOP delegate count in response to moving up the FL GOP primary?

Neither did I:
Appellants brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the RNC’s delegate-reduction penalty violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.2 Appellants allege that the RNC’s rules “underenfranchise[]” Hispanic Republican voters, because they allow early voting states—namely, Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Nevada— with comparatively small percentages of Republican Hispanic voters to skew the debate toward the interests of those states’ dominant demographics. As a result of the influence the RNC’s rules bestow on those states, Appellants contend that presidential candidates adopt positions contrary to those of Hispanic voters.
Naah, the GOP just loves Hispanic voters!

But alas, just like Priebus' cerebral cortex that night at the convention, the case was dead in its tracks:
In sum, because Appellants have not shown RNC is a state actor, the district court did not err in dismissing their complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of Preibus’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Unleash the Rubio!

Texting While Driving? No. Filming While Driving? YES!

In our latest WITWISA ("Where in the World is Spencer Aronfeld"?)  installment, Spence provides a worthwhile public service message about texting while driving, all while filming in his car as traffic whizzes by at unaccountably high speeds.

Maybe pull over into a parking lot first?  We're worried!

Monday, December 10, 2012

Pro Hac Vice -- Not for Locals Anymore!

Question:  Can an attorney who lives and practices in South Florida seek pro hac vice admission to the SD FL?

Answer:  Not really.
Ms. Centorino certifies that she is a member in good standing of the Florida state bar but not a member of the bar of this Court. D.E. 41 at 4. However, the Court notes that Ms. Centorino also resides and practices within this District. Rule 4 of the Special Rules Governing the Admission and Practice of Attorneys before this Court specifically provide that “[a]ttorneys residing and practicing within this District are expected to be members of the bar of this Court.” Ms. Centorino has not demonstrated why the Court should depart from this rule in her case, and therefore, the Court DENIES her pro hac vice motion.
Hmm, but what if your practice is limited to state court and you only appear in federal court infrequently?

You still have to pay the $201 admission fee (but no test anymore!).

In other news, now you have to be civil to each other.

"I guess what I'm trying to say is, if I can change, and you can change, everybody can change!"

Friday, December 7, 2012

How Does Pacenti Do It?

One minute he's seated at his typewriter pounding out a story on Claudio Osorio being criminally indicted, and the next he is at the Four Seasons glad-handing at the DBR's "Most Successful Lawyer" soiree.

Because he is a newspaperman, that's how.

Osorio was charged with fleecing investors of $40 million. The indictment also charges Osorio and co-conspiritors falsely obtained a $10 million loan from the Overseas Private Investment Corp., a U.S. government agency that promotes U.S. investments abroad to foster the development and growth of free markets. The loan was intended to build a factory and 500 homes in Haiti for families displaced by the 2010 earthquake.

I leave any discussion of all this to Rumpole and DOM who know what this means, but I observe that allegedly scamming Chris Korge and the government might increase your chances of being charged with a crime.

Ernie Souchak Pacenti reports that Osorio was to appear today before our pal U.S. Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman.

Begging the question: what song might the good Judge invoke to support his ruling?

N.B.: Two free movie tickets first class tickets to Jackson Hole and a week at my condo to anyone who scores a picture of Rumpole cocked and in a compromising position at the Public Defender office party.

Hemingway House Now an "Animal Exhibitor" Subject to USDA Regulation!

Listen, I know there are a bunch of cats on the grounds, but seriously?
Appellant 907 Whitehead Street, Inc., d/b/a Ernest Hemingway Home and Museum (“the Museum”), appeals the district court’s post-trial order denying the Museum declaratory and injunctive relief. The Museum challenges the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and its Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (collectively the “USDA”) to regulate the Museum as an animal exhibitor under the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”), 7 U.S.C. § 2131 et seq. The district court concluded that the Museum is indeed subject to the USDA’s regulatory reach pursuant to the AWA. After considering the parties’ arguments and having the benefit of oral argument, we agree with the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and hold that the Museum is an AWA animal exhibitor subject to USDA regulation.
Here's an example of the findings relied on by the district court and affirmed by the 11th:
The Museum has always kept, fed, and provided weekly veterinary care for the Hemingway cats. The cats live and roam freely on the grounds that are enclosed by a brick fence at the property’s perimeter. To prevent population beyond the historical norm of 50–60 cats, the majority of the cats are spayed or neutered so that only a couple of cats of each sex are reproductive. At the time of the district court’s bench trial, the Museum had 44 Hemingway cats.

No Hemingway cat has ever been bought or sold, although some cats have been given away at various times.2 However, the Museum charges admission for a tour of the property, and the tour includes seeing and discussing the roaming Hemingway cats.
Ok, thank God I don't charge admission to my house, or else the dogs and hamster would definitely subject me to USDA regulation.

I like the final "hold-your-nose" disclaimer at the end of the opinion:
Notwithstanding our holding, we appreciate the Museum’s somewhat unique situation, and we sympathize with its frustration. Nevertheless, it is not the court’s role to evaluate the wisdom of federal regulations implemented according to the powers constitutionally vested in Congress.

Thursday, December 6, 2012

How Many Pages Should Your Notice of Supplemental Authority Be?

 Maybe I'm one of those old fart lawyers Brian Tannebaum is always writing about, but I was taught that a notice of supplemental authority should be a one-page document listing the new case, with at most one line or two explaining its relevance.

It shouldn't be an opportunity to engage in another set of briefing that renders the federal rules superfluous.

But we all know lawyers who can't resist using the new case to reargue points already made in the briefs, and who go way overboard -- causing you a moral dilemma:  should you respond in kind?  Move to strike?  Turn the other cheek and ignore the sharp practice?  Hope the judge does something sua sponte?

Case in point:

This supplemental authority is fairly restrained, though you could argue it goes a paragraph too far.

But like the old Cold War doctrine of MAD, an overwhelming and devastating response was inevitable.

And here it is -- three full pages of responsive argument.

Not willing to leave well enough alone, here is the "reply" in support of the notice of supplemental authority -- four(!) more pages of pure argument.

Aren't there page limits in briefs for a reason?

Wednesday, December 5, 2012

3d DCA Watch -- Judge Cortinas Goes Full Carnes!

 Hi kids, can you feel the winter break taking hold in your practice yet?

The lawyers coming in later, leaving earlier, judges cancelling hearing, depositions being moved to 2013....let's just slide into the holidays, shall we?

Only two civil opinions of note this week, let's take a look:

FIGA v. Karelas:

Yes, it's nearly 2013 and Judge Schwartz is still entering orders like it's disco-era 1978!

Galleon Bay v. Bd. of Cty. Comm:

Whose writing style does this opening paragraph remind you of:
When apt-named Galleon1 first set out to develop its property, it could not have possibly imagined the tumultuous seas it would encounter in the decades that followed. While galleons have not been spotted on our shores since the Eighteenth Century, this is our Court’s seventh encounter with this case.
The Judge went full Carnes!

Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Judge Ryskamp Dismisses With Prejudice Groundwater Contamination Case!

It turns out that a few years ago a bunch of poor minority residents living in the Acreage area of western Palm Beach County learned that they had unusually high rates of cancer -- a "cancer cluster" -- not exactly great for property values (let alone health).

These residents then sued aeronautics giant Pratt & Whitney for contaminating their groundwater, claiming that the contamination emanated from a plant located several miles away.

On a second amended complaint, Judge Ryskamp dismissed the action with prejudice, relying on Iqbal and a lack of specificity in the allegations.

Here's an example:
The closest Plaintiffs come to making a specific allegation that something traveled from Pratt & Whitney to the Acreage is in Paragraphs 236 and 238, but those fall short of the mark. Plaintiffs allege that Pratt & Whitney and The Acreage “are underlain by” the same aquifer, and that “groundwater is drawn” from the Corbett Wildlife Management Area and Pratt & Whitney to the Acreage. Complaint, ¶236. Plaintiffs then allege that their experts:
confirm that the types of CCOCs . . . known to have been spilled . . . at the P&W site and by Pratt & Whitney in the Corbett National Wildlife Refuge [sic] have traveled to and physically invaded The Acreage, and are present in the groundwater of The Acreage Neighborhood and have contaminated the groundwater that the Plaintiffs’ and class members’ properties share with [THMs].
Sec. Am. Compl., ¶238. This allegation superficially appears specific, but is yet another generalized allegation that the “types of CCOCs” found at Pratt & Whitney traveled to somewhere under “The Acreage”—as opposed to under each Plaintiff’s property—and that these types of CCOCs “are present” in “the groundwater of The Acreage Neighborhood.” The mere allegation that chemicals at Pratt & Whitney “are present” in the groundwater of “the Acreage” does not mean that the chemical traveled from Pratt & Whitney to the Acreage, as any chemical in the Acreage could have come from a different source than Pratt & Whitney.
YUM -- time to bottle and sell that delicious vaguely contaminated Acreage water!

(Maybe they can sell some to that nearby Pratt & Whitney plant?)

BTW, plaintiffs' lawyer Craig Zobel said he had plenty of evidence:
“We respectfully disagree,” he said. Contrary to Ryskamp’s ruling, Zobel said, he submitted thousands of pages of records linking Pratt & Whitney to the cancer cluster. He hired an appraiser, who reviewed all 17,000 pieces of land and methodically showed how property values plunged. He hired hydrologists to track how toxins moved through underground water supplies. He hired urologists and toxicologists who linked Magaly Pinares’ kidney cancer to the toxins found in her well.

“We had a wealth of data,” he said.
But how much of it was in the second amended complaint?

What "Format" is Your Lawsuit?

The gender discrimination suit filed by a GT shareholder in the Philly office contains some blockbuster allegations.

ATL found this nugget -- that the only way for women attorneys to get ahead at GT is to sleep with their male superiors (see paragraphs 69-72).

Wow, wow, and wow.

But Hilarie Bass says au contraire:
“The format of the lawsuit reflects an effort to extort money from us,” Bass said. “Our shareholder agreement has an arbitration clause that she is well aware of and instead she chose to file a class action in federal court.” Bass said even if the case ends up in court, she believes it will be an individual lawsuit rather than a class action.
The "format" of the lawsuit -- what an unusual word choice.

I suppose she means the procedural posture -- a class action filed in federal court.  But that doesn't automatically equate to extortion, or does it?

This is another gem:
The suit alleges that Lehr, regional operating shareholder in charge of Philadelphia, told Griesing at one point that only “tall, male and Jewish GT lawyers generate business” and that there is “no formula” for compensation and that it is entirely subjective, commenting that female shareholders are “lucky” to get paid as much as they do.
"Tall, male and Jewish" -- just like Cesar Alvarez!

GT insiders -- speak up, is there any truth to these allegations?
 more here:

Read more here:

Monday, December 3, 2012

Spencer Aronfeld -- Don't Trust What People Put on Their Websites!

Good morning!

In the news this morning:

1.   Yes, the Dolphins still suck.

2.  SHB attorney Marc Levinson now knows never to invite Nevin Shapiro to your bachelor's party (you may have to give a deposition about it later).

3. Spencer Aronfeld was on Tyra (about 5:30 in).

4.  Kendall Coffey lives part-time in Melbourne.


5. Happy Birthday, text message!

And how was your weekend?