If you are reading this, then you are already guilty of spinning your wheels this morning.
But you know who else is also guilty, of even more egregious "judicial wheelspinning"? -- yes, our treasured bunker inhabitants.
Motors v. Miami Medley:
So are the Kozel factors -- which must be applied when sanctioning counsel or parties -- to be articulated and set forth in any sanctions order, or are they completely superfluous when everybody really knows what happened, wink wink:
Contrary to the position taken by Miami Medley, the order granting the motion for sanctions for defendant’s failure to attend mediation contains no acknowledgment, discussion or analysis of any of the Kozel factors. The order states merely that the motion is granted because defendants failed to appear at a duly scheduled mediation, of which defendants’ counsel was given notice. When presented with defendants’ sworn motion, alleging that the failure to attend mediation was the fault of the attorney and that the client was never made aware mediation had been ordered and scheduled, the trial court grossly abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the default without considering whether the default was improvidently granted and without addressing the Kozel factors.Come on! -- sayeth Judge Schwartz in dissent, don't waste my time with these bright-line rules, they just cloud the swift imposition of justice (I'm paraphrasing):
Returning the case to the court below for the purely formulaic purpose of expressing in writing what we already know to be true is no more than judicial “wheel spinning” which we should avoid, not encourage.But shouldn't we encourage the straightforward application of the law? Is there no jurisprudential purpose served by requiring trial judges to set forth in writing the Kozel factors?
Can the exception for "what we already know to be true" be fairly applied?
Oh well, let's all get back to our timewasters.