I've got a spring in my step this morning, and am actually trying to diligently litigate instead of wasting time on this crappy blog.
What about you?
Shut the forty-six open pages on your browser down and get back to work!
(But if you're still here, read on.....)
R.J. Reynolds v. Ballard:
Plaintiff's verdict affirmed despite a few choice statements by counsel.
Trek Bicycle v. Miguelez:
Personally I'm sick of juries being entrusted with deciding proximate cause -- these people can't even get out of jury service:
The issue of proximate causation is generally a question of fact concerned with “whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the specific injury that actually occurred.” McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992). The Florida Supreme Court has stated that “harm is ‘proximate’ in a legal sense if prudent human foresight would lead one to expect that similar harm is likely to be substantially caused by the specific act or omission in question.” McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503. The conduct alleged here, failure to warn that damaged carbon fiber could fail suddenly, was not the conduct which was the proximate cause of the injury in this case. Road debris getting caught in the front spokes causing the wheel to suddenly stop is the proximate cause.Salas v. Alexander:
What happens when you enter a TRO and set a bond but give no date for compliance?
By giving the movant the unfettered right to determine when the injunction will take effect, the order effectively precludes the non-movant from seeking dissolution of the order for failure to post the bond. After all, how can the nonmovant seek to dissolve a temporary injunction order for failure to post a bond when the order contains no date by which the bond must be posted?Seems really obvious but I guess it can't hurt to put it in writing -- someone will get right on that!
In light of this, we recommend that the Civil Procedure Rules Committee of the Florida Bar consider proposing an amendment to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610 to require a trial court to include, in its order granting a temporary injunction, a timeframe within which the bond must be posted.