3d DCA Watch -- Life is a Coin Flip Edition!

Hi kids, it's that time again, where the Bunker Hill Gang issues forth important pronouncements from their heavily fortified concrete enclosure, all while looking absolutely fabulous doing it!

Let's peek in:

OJ McDuffie v. Uribe:

This high-profile case lingers on:
The appellant’s motion for rehearing is denied without prejudice to raise the issue of prejudgment interest should an appeal be taken from the retrial of this matter.
So we will be seeing this one (yet) again.

Pages v. Seliman:

This is your typical South Florida parking experience, involving inexplicable, violent road rage and a defense to the subsequent civil suit based on Florida's Stand Your Ground law:
Following an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate issued a detailed fourteen page report and recommendation with factual findings, credibility assessments, and a conclusion that Tapia established by a preponderance of that evidence that he “had a reasonable fear for the safety of his wife, Ms. Singer, given Dr. Pages’ immediate and continuing aggressive behavior and, based on this reasonable fear, [Tapia] rushed over and pushed Dr. Pages hard to keep him from coming closer to his wife, Ms. Singer.”7 Thus, because a determination was made that Tapia reasonably believed he had to act to defend against Pages’ imminent use of “unlawful force” upon Tapia’s wife, Tapia was justified in the use of non-deadly force under section 776.012, rendering unnecessary any further discussion of the alternative provisions or requirements of section 776.013(3).
And all just to get a pineapple Froyo!

Courtney v. Edwards:

This is an interesting order by Judge Wells.

And Judge Bailey is right:  Henry Courtney is a "fine lawyer."

To deprive him of a modest fee for his early work in a case, after it settled following a $19 million jury verdict, seems wrong.

And to do so based on the oft-stated yet never analyzed or empirically validated presumption that a more "aggressive" lawyer is a "better" lawyer seems doubly wrong:
We quash the order in part because a client’s desire to hire a more aggressive lawyer with greater “expertise” than the lawyer initially hired does not deprive the initially discharged attorney of entitlement to be paid for his or her work. This would make charging liens all but superfluous.
Seems fundamental, no?

Or am I missing something?


  1. I thought Bailey was smarter than to deny an attorneys lien fee. Guess not. Very basic.


Post a Comment